The paper investigates the costs of waste disposal and recycling services by using a well-behaved Composite cost function model. Our estimates on a unique sample of more than 500 Italian municipalities highlight that the refuse collection technology exhibits constant returns to scale as well as scope economies between disposal and recycling. As far as the size of the municipality increases, scope economies rise up to 14%, but they are accompanied with overall diseconomies of scale. Our findings suggest that, on the one hand, joint management of disposal and recycling should be encouraged, and, on the other hand, that strategies aimed at increasing the share of waste sent for recycling would not imply a considerable increase in total costs.
Introduction
In local public services such as energy, water, public transport, the attention of policymakers has been devoted, on the one hand, on environmental regulation, and, on the other hand, on the promotion of competition and cost efficiency. As to the second issue, the policies that have been proposed are a mixture of mandatory divestitures, unbundling and competitive tendering, but ownership and corporate governance changes (ranging from privatization or the promotion of private public partnerships to forms of intermunicipal alliances) have been suggested as well.
Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) services, similarly to other network industries, have undergone radical changes in both organizational and market structure. On the basis of EU directives 2006/12 and 2008/98, waste management legislation and policy should be inspired by a principle of hierarchy: prevention, preparing for reuse, recycling, recovery and disposal. This implies an increasing role of separated collection, with a target of 50% of MSW by 2020. In Italy, the legislation has foreseen even more ambitious targets (the share of waste sent for recycling was 15% for 1999, 25% within 2001, and up to 60% in 2011) . The reforms introduced by the Ronchi's decree (law 22/1997) and by the Environmental Code (law 152/2006) aimed at favouring the integrated management of a too much fragmented production process, as well as at promoting competitive tendering procedures for the management of waste collection. Moreover, they introduced a new tariff system that, creating a direct connection between the solid waste generated by households and the amount to be paid for refuse collection, should induce citizens to adopt a more responsible environmental behaviour.
As pointed out by Callan and Thomas (2001) , the empirical literature has devoted much more attention to demand-side aspects (i.e., how to discourage land disposal, how to encourage recycling and recovery, how to design and implement an optimal pricing program, and so on) 2 than to supply-side issues such as the cost analysis of the MSW market. The evidence on the costs of waste collection and recycling is even more scant, as pointed out by Bohm et al. (2010) :
"The growth in curbside recycling has presumably evolved independently of costs and, perhaps for this reason, the economics literature is largely silent (with a few important exceptions)
on understanding the costs of municipal waste and recycling services. Data limitations may have also hampered investigations into costs" (Bohm et al., 2010, p. 864) .
Since the collection of recycling waste has now reached a quite established share (though, at least for the case of Italy, not fully consistent across the whole national territory), and indeed is a strongly encouraged practice in the planning of public services, an analysis of the costs of joint collection of disposal and recycling waste seems of great relevance.
This paper aims to contribute to the above ongoing debate by analysing the cost structure of a sample of more than 500 Italian municipalities that provided waste collection and disposal services during years [2004] [2005] [2006] . From a methodological point of view, we will take into account, on the one hand, the multi-product nature of the MSW service by allowing for separate outputs for waste simply taken to disposal sites or incinerated and waste sent for recycling, and we will use, on the other hand, a flexible cost function model that is well equipped to measure scope and scale economies at different output levels. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the relevant literature will be briefly reviewed. In section 3 we will present our empirical cost function model. In section 4 we will present our dataset and we will show some first descriptive statistics. Section 5 will show our main results, while section 6 concludes.
Literature review
Starting from the seminal works of Hirsch (1965) and Stevens (1978) , scholars have analysed the costs of the refuse collection industry by investigating mainly issues such as the optimal scale of operation and the efficiency comparison between private and publicly owned operators. Overall, albeit there is some variance across studies, the results are pointing towards the existence of scale economies for relatively small communities that are exhausted when the population reaches a certain threshold (50,000 inhabitants according to Stevens, 1978) . Another common results is that, rather than the type of ownership itself, the key factor which is more likely to bring cost savings in waste management activities is the organization of competitive tendering procedures.
However, the bulk of the empirical papers have made use of rather ad hoc simple cost function models. 4 In a typical study, (average or total) costs are regressed on output (a measure of pick up points or of the quantity of waste collected in a year) and other explanatory variables without taking into consideration the role of input prices, and without respecting some common standard microeconomic theory assumptions (i.e. the so called regularity conditions, such as Shephard's lemma, linear homogeneity with respect to input prices, and so on).
An under explored topic, despite its increasing relevance, is the multi-product nature of the refuse collection service. While in some instances the costs of recycling have been analysed by including the share of waste sent for recycling among the regressors, there are very few papers that jointly consider disposal and recycling.
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature in both respects. From a methodological point of view, we will estimate a Composite cost function model, imposing restrictions in order to ensure that estimated costs are originating from a well-behaved cost function specification. In doing so, waste disposed and waste sent for recycling are considered as two separate but interacted outputs, so that it will be possible to infer whether economies of scope are characterising the provision of both services.
Empirical studies of the costs of recycling
Carroll (1995) (Bel and Fageda, 2010, p. 192) . Bohm et al. (2010) analysed both solid waste disposal and recycling activities on a sample of 428 US communities for year 1996. Two quadratic cost functions (one for disposal, one for recycling) were simultaneously estimated using Zellner's SUR model. 6 While the average cost function for disposal was found to be everywhere decreasing, highlighting the presence of increasing returns to scale, the one for recycling was exhibiting a U shape, suggesting that, after a certain threshold, the costs for recycling were increasing sharply. Callan and Thomas (2001) are, to the best of our knowledge, the only available study where disposal and recycling are jointly analysed in a context of a multi-product cost function framework.
Using a sample of 110 municipalities in Massachusetts observed for years 1996-1997, they estimated two separate cost functions for the two services, each of which was including an interaction term between outputs. By doing so, they were able to measure, together with scale economies, scope effects too. The results suggested the presence of constant returns to scale for disposal and increasing returns to scale for recycling. Most importantly, the coefficients on the interaction terms were both found to be negative, and the computations referring to an hypothetical "average sample firm" revealed the presence of scope economies of the order of 5%. 
Model specification
As already pointed out, to the best of our knowledge, only Antonioli and Filippini (2002) where C refers to the total cost of production, Y i refers to outputs (in our two-output case i, j = Disposal (D) and Recycling (R)), P r indicates factor prices (in our three-input case r, l = Labor (L), Capital (K) and Energy (E)), and ψ C is a random noise having appropriate distributional properties to reflect the stochastic structure of the cost model. where ψ r is the error term relating to the cost-share r.
However, due to its log-additive output structure, the Translog model suffers from the well-known inability to evaluate cost behavior when any output is zero. This has been proved to yield unreasonable and/or very unstable values of the estimates for scope economies. For such a reason, empirical studies based on the Translog specification often rely on measures of pairwise cost complementarities for analyzing cost synergies between outputs 9 .
To overcome the above problems, Pulley and Braunstein (1992) proposed as an alternative functional form for multi-product technologies the Composite Specification (CS). The CS cost function originates from the combination of the log-quadratic input price structure of the TS specification with a quadratic structure for multiple outputs. This makes the model particularly suitable for empirical cost analysis. The quadratic output structure is appropriate to model cost behavior in the range of zero output levels and gives the CS specification a clear advantage over the TS form as far as the measurement of both economies of scope and product-specific economies of scale are concerned. 10 In addition, the log-quadratic input price structure can be easily constrained to be linearly homogeneous.
The CS cost function is written as: and the corresponding input cost-share equations are 8 Cost-shares are computed as S r = (X r P r )/C. By Shephard's Lemma X r = ∂C/∂P r , where X r is the input demand for the rth input, so that S r = ∂ lnC/ ∂ lnP r . 9 For a twice continuously differentiable cost function, cost complementarities are present at Y' if
Cost complementarities between two products imply that the marginal cost of producing one output decreases as the quantity of the other good is increased. Baumol et al. (1982) have shown that a multi-product cost function characterized by weak cost complementarities over the full set of outputs up to the observed level of output exhibits scope economies. 10 See Piacenza and Vannoni (2004) and Piacenza et al. (2010) , for more details on CS-type models and for some applications to the cost analysis of multi-product firms. 
Given the regularity conditions ensuring duality between the production function and the cost function, the CS specification does not impose a priori restrictions on the characteristics of the underlying technology. Thus, it is a flexible form in the sense of Diewert (1974) 
Data Description
Our dataset refers to a balanced panel of 529 Italian municipalities providing waste disposal and recycling services over the period [2004] [2005] [2006] , for a total of 1587 pooled observations. The sample composition by geographical area, ownership form and output mix is presented in Table 1 . 39% of observations refer to municipalities localized in Northern and Southern Italy, respectively, while the remaining 22% are localized in the central regions of the country.
As to the organizational form chosen to provide the service, in-house provision form accounts for 10% of the total sample, and is mostly concentrated in the South. A similar pattern can be observed for intermunicipal partnership, which accounts for only 8% of the municipalities (with a prevalence in the South). Finally, the limited responsibility company is by far the most popular juridical form chosen to organize the refuse collection service (82% of the entire sample and 94% of municipalities in the North).
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Turning now towards our main variable of interest, i.e. recycling activities, Table 1 shows that the share of the total waste volume designated for recycling is 20%. However, this average value is heavily dependent on the more virtuous Northern municipalities (where waste sent for recycling accounts for 37% of the total), while the shares of recyclable waste collected in Southern and Central regions of the country are rather limited (7% and 13%, respectively).
On the whole, our sample can be considered as fairly representative of the entire population.
In fact, official data (see Chiades and Torrini, 2008) show statistics which are very similar to the ones reported above. 14 Summary statistics on outputs, input prices and shares as well as other demographic and urban variables are provided in Table 2 .
Estimation and Results
Both the TS and CS specifications of the multi-product cost function are estimated jointly with their associated input cost-share equations. In order to ensure that the cost functions are linearly homogeneous in input prices we normalize total cost and input prices by the price of energy.
Because the three share equations sum to unity, to avoid singularity of the covariance matrix only the labor and capital equations (S L and S K , respectively) are included in (Zellner, 1962) .
The summary results of the NLSUR estimations for the TS and CS models are presented in Table 3 . 15 The first rows present the estimates of cost elasticities with respect to outputs and factor prices for the 'average' municipality. 16 The latter are very easy to recover from TS model, in that McElroy's (1977) R 2 can be used as a measure of the goodness of fit for the NLSUR system. The results suggest that the fit is roughly the same for both specifications. More rigorously, the Vuong's (1989) statistics for selection among non-nested models (VLR test), that consists in normalizing the standard LR test in order to account for the fact that the models to be compared are not nested, is significantly different from zero. We must therefore conclude that the CS model does a better job in describing observed data. Moreover, it enjoys a clear advantage over the TS model as far as the measurement of scope and scale economies is concerned, as it has been discussed in section 3. Scale economies (SE) can be measured by computing the inverse of the sum of output cost elasticities, 15 The Translog model is estimated with NLSUR so that it is straightforward to make comparisons with the Composite model. However, we estimated also the TS model using iterated GLS as well as maximum likelihood estimators. As expected, the results are virtually unchanged across the three different estimation procedures. 16 The average municipality (the point of normalization) corresponds to an hypothetical council operating at an average level of production for each output and facing average values of the input price variables. 17 A similar pattern can be observed by comparing the estimated sums of squared errors (SSE) of the cost and inputshare equations.
while scope economies (SCOPE) are computed by comparing the costs of specialized production with the costs of jointly providing Y D and Y R : The costs of joint production C(Y D , Y R ) -row C -are always lower than the sum of the costs
. This is suggestive of the fact that the cost function exhibits scope economies at all simulated output levels, thus justifying the choice to assign the two services through a single tender. However, scope economies are rather limited (and not significantly different from zero) up to λ =1, and become more important at higher output levels (7% for λ = 4
and 14% for λ = 8).
The results for aggregate scale economies summarize the patterns reported above. The figures reported in the last row of Table 4 imply that, by doubling the amounts of refuse collection 18 The results of the Translog specification show the presence of cost complementarities, since the coefficient on the parameter α DR of equation [1] is negative (-0.12) and statistically significant. 19 The presence of constant returns to scale for relatively small municipalities is consistent with Carroll (1995) , who was using a sample of municipalities of an average population size of 26,284 inhabitants. In addition, the finding of scale diseconomies in correspondence with higher output levels is consistent with the analysis conducted by Antonioli and Filippini (2002) , as far as disposal is concerned, and with the outcomes obtained by Bohm et al. (2010) , as far as recycling is concerned. 20 For example, moving from λ =1 to λ =8, costs increase by a factor of 9 for disposal and by a factor of 9.5 for recycling.
(both disposal and recycling), costs are doubling up to λ =1. At municipality sizes above the sample mean, however, overall diseconomies of scale appear, but the presence of scope economies counterbalances the effect of decreasing returns to scale for both recycling and disposal activities.
Therefore, the resulting estimates of aggregate scale diseconomies are found to be not very large.
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In spite of the fact that Table 4 Table 4 , the municipality size has been scaled up and down by multiplying and dividing the average sample quantities by the parameter λ. The shapes of the "isoquant" curves offer some very interesting insights. As expected, costs increase in correspondence with higher shares of recycling, but this happens especially at higher percentages and for municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
The joint interplay of scope economies and decreasing returns to scale for the recycling technology implies that:
a) It is not very costly to increase the percentages of recycling up to 30%-35% at all municipalities' sizes. For example, increasing recycling shares from 10% to 20% would imply that total costs increase by about 4% in correspondence of all estimated sizes (i.e. for λ ranging from 0.25 to 8).
Moreover, for municipalities of a population size of about 300.000 inhabitants (λ =8), the increase of Share R from zero up to 10%-15% implies a slight reduction of total costs; 22 b) It is not very costly to increase even further the percentages of recycling for relatively small municipalities;
c) It is indeed very costly to increase the ratio Share R beyond certain levels for large municipalities.
For example, when λ = 8, costs increase by 32.5% if Share R increases from 20% to 40%.
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21 The results of the Translog specification are remarkably similar also with respect to the estimates of scale economies for municipalities larger or smaller than the sample average. 22 This is due to the fact that the effect of economies of scope is still dominating over the effect of decreasing returns to scale for recycling. 23 Notice that for municipalites with population above 100,000 inhabitants, Share R is on average 18% with a maximum value of 42%. Therefore, one should use particular caution when interpreting results for large councils (i.e. when λ = 4 and λ = 8), because the curves in Figure 1b partially rely on out of the sample simulations.
The above results can be partially reconciled with some of the results summarized in section 2.1. are working on a sample of a much smaller size as compared to our sample of Italian municipalities. Even if we are using a different methodology, results a) and b) are consistent with the absence of significant effects of recycling shares on total costs found for Galician municipalities. However, since our flexible functional form allows us to investigate the shape of the cost function at all output levels, we can better qualify their findings. Our estimates suggest that, for municipalities of a population size above 50,000 inhabitants, the impact of Share R is not negligible anymore, and becomes very strong in correspondence with high values of λ. Bohm et al. (2010) report increasing returns to scale for municipalities that recycle up to 13,200 tons and decreasing returns to scale for larger quantities. Our sample of Italian municipalities exhibits decreasing returns to scale, too, but they appear at lower output regions (at about 4,000 tons).
We believe that our analysis can be useful for policymakers who are interested in pursuing strategies aimed at increasing the volume of recycling services. As already pointed out, recycling shares are still rather low in Italy, especially in the Southern regions. Our findings suggest that, keeping constant the total amount of waste collected, it is worth to expand recycling programs where the recycling shares are very low (irrespective of the size of the municipality), and, in the case of higher starting levels of Share R , where the population size is below 150,000-200,000
persons. Moreover, as argued by Bohm et al. (2010) , the extra costs reported in Figures 1a) and 1b) are not taking into account possible revenues stemming from the sale of recyclable materials, as well as possible savings in the total waste collected due to a more responsible and environment friendly behaviour on the part of households. 24 Both arguments should have the effect of flattering the shape of the cost functions plotted in Figure 1 , thereby reinforcing our arguments in favour of the improving of recycling activities.
Extended model
As a first robustness check, we have split the sample and run separate regressions for small, medium size and large municipalities, as well as for the three different geographical areas. The results are very similar across sub-samples. However, our baseline model is, admittedly, very parsimonious, in that it only considers output quantities and input prices as right hand side variables. Therefore, we have enriched our specification by adding other explanatory variables that have been usually considered in the literature. The second column of Table 5 reports the estimates of the extended model. The coefficient of t is not statistically significant, so that, in the three year period under investigation, there has not been a significant technological progress. Small and medium sized cities appear to be characterized by lower collection costs as compared to municipalities that serve more than 50,000 citizens (the omitted category). Moreover, the costs are estimated to be lower in the Northern and Central regions of the country, confirming our a priori expectations.
The results on ownership type and Density are intriguing and deserve more discussion.
The negative and significant coefficient on In house suggests that, as compared to the omitted category (Corp), in house arrangements are characterized by lower costs. Albeit the results reached by the literature are rather mixed , our finding is somewhat contrary to expectations. We have two possible explanations for it. First, it is possible that for refusal collection services which are directly provided by the municipality, some costs categories (depreciation, interests on debts) are not fully reported, so that costs result to be underestimated. inhabitants, we found that In house keeps its positive sign but loses significance.
The coefficient of Intermun is positive but not significant. While Bel and Mur (2009) and Sorensen (2007) offer arguments and some empirical results in favor or against intermunicipal agreements as a way to reduce costs, our results, which show no significant effect, are inconclusive with respect to this important issue. 29 As a final remark, we must recall that our omitted category, Corp, is including mostly publicly owned firms (see footnotes 27 and 11), so that we are not able to examine the effect of full (or partial) privatization on costs. This must be considered if one wants to correctly interpret and appreciate our findings for the variables Intermun and In house.
The coefficient on Density is found to be positive and significant. It is not rare in this field of studies to interpret the sign and magnitude of such a coefficient as evidence of the existence of economies\diseconomies of density. 30 However, we think that in the case of the refuse collection industry, given the high correlation existing between municipality size and degree of urbanization as proxied by a density measure, it is not appropriate to make such an inference. A positive coefficient could indicate, as suggested by Bohm et al. (2010) , that high-density municipalities may incur high costs to transport waste due to the inability to operate vehicles in densely populated urban areas, 31 as well as to the need to drive towards remote landfills for disposal. In order to 28 The authors found, for a sample of Italian municipalities, a negative impact of In house arrangements on costs, too. 29 Bel and Fageda (2009) , working on Spanish data, argue that intermunicipal agreements can be used as a way to reach scale economies for relatively small municipalities, while Sorensen (2007) , working on Norwegian data, underlines the difficulties of managing the service when the ownership is very dispersed, as in the case of intermunicipal joint ventures. Consistently with Sorensen's analysis, Garrone et al. (2010) found for a sample of Italian utilities operating in gas, water, electricity and refuse collection in the years 1997-2006, a positive and significant impact of a proxy of Intermun on total costs. 30 Compare, for example, the comments offered by Bohm et al. (2010) and Carroll and Thomas (2001) , who both found a positive coefficient on Density (measured as persons per square mile and number of homes per square mile, respectively). 31 For instance, the presence of narrow streets may reduce the ability to use large, specialized equipment. In addition, the extent of on-street parking may involve difficulties in using some automated machinery, with the consequence that operators are forced to use more manual labor.
elaborate more on this, we have split Density into two variables, used as proxies for horizontal and vertical degrees of urbanization:
The last column of Table 5 highlights that both coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero, but the impact of Urb HOR is much higher. Therefore, the results are suggestive of the fact that congestion problems are more serious when the population is spread over several buildings with fewer floors than in the case with higher vertical development of buildings insisting on a given surface.
The traditional approach to measure density economies in network industries (Caves et al., 1985) , requires to enrich the models (N) as an additional "output" (i, j) and to measure density economies as:
[10]
and scale economies as:
The cost elasticity with respect to N ( Therefore, our results suggest that aggregating nearby councils (which implies to increase simultaneously both waste collection and N) could not bring savings in total costs.
32 Notice than in the last two columns of Table 5 the coefficient on Y D is lower than the estimates reported for the baseline model (incidentally, when adding a proxy for density among the regressors, Bohm et al. (2010) experience a similar contraction, too). Coupling our discussion about the role of the variable Density with our results for density economies (DE), we do not think that the estimates of the extended models should be considered as supportive of the presence of increasing aggregate returns to scale for the average firm. Our interpretation is that the variable Density is capturing part of the magnitude of the output elasticity D CY ε .
Summary and conclusions
Despite the importance of the refuse collection service and the rising worries about the impact of waste disposal activities on the environment, the empirical literature on the costs of garbage collection and disposal is rather limited. The available empirical works mostly concentrate on the US, and, most importantly, recycling activities are rarely included into the analysis.
Our paper provides fresh evidence on the above issues by analysing a sample of Italian municipalities which are observed in the years [2004] [2005] [2006] . From a methodological point of view, we jointly consider waste taken to disposal sites or incinerated and waste sent for recycling in a multi-product framework. Moreover, we will estimate cost function models which are consistent with the duality assumptions of microeconomic theory.
Our results suggest that, for a municipality of a size of about 42,500 inhabitants, the refuse collection industry exhibits aggregate constant returns to scale, while moderate economies of scope can be enjoyed by simultaneously providing disposal and recycling services. While scope economies are increasing with the size of the council (up to 14% when inhabitants are about 300,000), decreasing returns in the collection of both garbage and waste sent for recycling are such that moderate overall diseconomies of scale appear for large municipalities.
Our simulations suggest that it is worth to devote efforts to increase the share of recycling activities up to 30%-35%, since the total costs of refuse collection would not increase too much, and this is especially true for relatively small municipalities.
The estimates of the extended model add new important insights. First, refuse collection costs are found to be lower in the Northern regions of the country and for municipalities with a population below 20,000 inhabitants. Second, urban areas face higher congestion costs especially due to horizontal urbanization effect there is clear evidence of the existence of density economies.
Finally, councils that are relying on intermunicipal joint-ventures as organization forms to provide the service are not exhibiting lower costs.
From a policy point of view, we think that the above set of results provide some useful insights. Our computations suggest that recycling programs should be strongly encouraged, since total costs are not likely to increase sharply. This is particularly important in a country like Italy where, as reported in our descriptive statistics, the share of recycling activities is somewhat limited, especially in the South. The presence of density economies suggests that franchised monopolies could be the better form to provide the service, while the existence of scope economies suggests that tender procedures should be organized so as to consider disposal and recycling activities as a single bundle. However, since we found constant returns to scale up to 21,000 tons of waste 20 collection (i.e. up to a service area of about 45,000 inhabitants), we cannot provide support for the arguments in favour of the consolidation of the service for small municipalities, Finally, our results provide useful insights for managers in charge of the planning and management of the refuse collection services. In fact, managers must have a precise idea of the costs of garbage collection and on the impact of recycling activities on total costs when they must decide whether and to what extent participating to tendering procedures or simply when they are required to compute the budget plans for the waste management activity. Vuong (1989) . The VLR statistic is distributed as a N (0,1). .*** Significant at 1 percent level in a two-tailed test. ** Significant at 5 percent level * Significant at 10 percent level. For the SE index the null hypothesis is that it is not significantly different from one 
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